Abstract. The AES block cipher has a 128-bit block length and a user key of 128, 192 or In the single-key attack scenario, attacking 8 rounds is the best currently known cryptanalytic result for AES in terms of the numbers of attacked rounds, and our attack has a dramatically smaller data complexity than the currently known attacks on 8-round AES under 192 key bits.
Introduction
In 2001, NIST published the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [14] as the new-generation data encryption standard for use in the USA, designed to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [15] . AES is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which has a total of 10 rounds for a 128-bit key, 12 rounds for a 192-bit key and 14 rounds for a 256-bit key. It became a CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher [2] in 2002, a NESSIE selected algorithm [16] in 2003, and was adopted as an ISO international standard [11] in 2005. Since AES is increasingly widely used in many real-life cryptographic applications, it is essential to continuing to investigate its security against different cryptanalytic techniques. In this paper, we denote below by AES-128/192/256 the versions of AES that respectively use 128, 192 and 256 key bits, and we focus on the security of AES-192 in the single-key attack scenario.
Many cryptanalytic results on the security of AES-192 (in the single-key attack scenario) have been published so far [4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18] ; and in terms of the numbers of attacked rounds, the square attack [3] on 8-round AES-192 [8] is the best currently published cryptanalytic result for AES-192, which requires almost the entire codebook and has a time complexity of 2 188 8-round AES encryptions.
Building on the work described in [9] , in 2008 Demirci and Selçuk [4] described a 4-round property of AES, and used it as the basis of meet-in-themiddle attacks [6] on 7-round AES-192 and 8-round AES-256. In 2009, Deirci et al. [5] suggested a method to improve the 4-round property, yielding a 4-round differential [1] property, and they gave meet-in-the-middle attacks on 7-round AES-128/192 and 8-round AES-256. However, most recently Dunkelman et al. [7] pointed out a flaw in Deirci et al.'s attacks, and more importantly, Dunkelman et al. described another variant of the 4-round property due to Demirci and Selçuk, which they referred to as a multiset variant, and introduced two new cryptanalytic techniques, namely differential enumeration and key bridging, where the key bridging technique was used to drive (from AES-192's key schedule) the observation that the last column of the initial subkey can be deduced from three columns of the 8-th round key, (although they are 8 rounds away). Finally, by taking advantage of these techniques Dunkelman et al. described an attack on 8-round AES-192, which requires 2 113 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2 172 8-round AES encryptions.
In this paper, we find that a meet-in-the-middle attack on 8-round AES-192 can be obtained from Demirci and Selçuk's and Demirci et al.'s work, which is based on the following two simple observations: First, we use a 4-round differential property obtained by applying Deirci et al.'s method to Demirci and Selçuk's 4-round property; and second, we observe that three concerned bytes of the 7-th round key can be deduced from the 8-th round key (this observation is not novel, and similar ones had been extensively used in previous work, for instance [12] The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we describe the notation and the AES block cipher when used with a 192-bit key. In Section 3, we review some related results from previous work. In Section 4, we present our meet-in-the-middle attacks on 8-round AES-192. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section we give the notation used throughout this paper, and then briefly describe the AES block cipher when used with a 192-bit key.
Notation
In all descriptions we assume that a number without a prefix expresses a decimal number, and a number with prefix 0x expresses a hexadecimal number. We use the following notation throughout this paper.
⊕ bitwise logical exclusive OR (XOR) of two bit srings of the same length ≪ left rotation of a bit string • polynomial multiplication modulo the polynomial
The 16 bytes of a 4 × 4 byte array are numbered from top to bottom from left to right, starting with 0; an example is given below, where a 0 , a 1 , · · · , a 15 ∈ {0, 1} 8 . 
0x02 0x03 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x03 0x01 0x01 0x02
0x0e 0x0b 0x0d 0x09 0x09 0x0e 0x0b 0x0d 0x0d 0x09 0x0e 0x0b 0x0b 0x0d 0x09 0x0e
AES-192 uses a total of thirteen 128-bit subkeys
, all derived from a user key K of six 32-bit words long. The key schedule is as follows, where Rcon[i/6] are public constants.
Represent the user key K as six 32-bit words (W
AES takes as input a 128-bit plaintext block P , represented as a 4 × 4 byte array. AES-192 has a total of 12 rounds, and its encryption procedure is follows, where x is a 16-byte variable.
1. x = ARK(P, K 0 ). 2. For i = 1 to 11:
An equivalent description of the algorithm can be derived by reversing the order of the third and fourth operations of Step 2 of the above description, i.e. the operations involving MC and ARK. These two steps then become:
where
We use this alternative representation in certain of the attacks described later.
The ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description is referred to below as Round i, and the transformations in Steps 3 and 4 are referred to below as the final round (i.e. Round 12). We write K i,j (respectively, K i,j ) for the jth byte of K i (respectively, K i ), (0 ≤ j ≤ 15).
Related Results from Previous Work
In this section, we briefly review some related results from Demirci and Selçuk's, Demirci et al.'s and Dunkelman et al.'s work, which will be used in our attack. We refer the reader to [4, 5, 7] for details.
Demirci and Selçuk's Attack on 7-Round AES-192
In 2008, Demirci and Selçuk [4] described the following 4-round property for AES.
Proposition 1 (A 4-Round Property). Let S be a set of 256 4×4 byte arrays 
. Building on the 4-round property, Demirci and Selçuk first gave a basic meetin-the-middle attack on 7-round AES; the attack procedure can be described as follows. 
represents the ratio of the number of the columns that need to decrypt to the total number of the columns in 7-round AES.
Finally, Demirci and Selçuk described a data-time-memory tradeoff version of the above basic attack which can be applied to 7-round AES-192 (for some n > 14): The precomputation has a time complexity of 2 205.78−n 7-round AES encryptions, and with a success probability of 98%, the attack requires 2 34+n chosen plaintexts and a memory of 2 210−4×n bytes, and has a time complexity of 2 88.2+n 7-round AES encryptions.
Demirci et al.'s Method to Improve the 4-Round Property
Observe that there are 25 constant parameters for f in Demirci and Selçuk's 4-round property. It would be desirable to decrease the number of parameters. In 2009, Demirci et al. [5] suggested the following method to improve Demirci and Selçuk's 4-round property: Consider the difference between the result of encrypting X (i) using 4 rounds of AES and the result of encrypting another byte array X (l) = (x (l) j ) j=0,1,···,15 from the set S using 4 rounds of AES, that is y
. By this method, one constant parameter (i.e., the first byte of the 4-th round key) is canceled out. We refer to a 4-round property using this method as a 4-round differential property.
If we apply Demirci et al.'s method to Demirci and Selçuk's 4-round property, then we can easily get a 4-round differential property with 24 constant parameters. Demirci et al. did not describe this 4-round differential property in their paper, but instead they gave a 4-round differential property with 15 constant parameters that holds with probability 2 −72 , and finally used it to conduct meet-in-the-middle attacks on 7-round AES-128/192 and 8-round AES-256; the attack procedures are similar to Demirci and Selçuk's attacks, and the main difference is due to use of the 4-round differential property with 15 constant parameters. Besides, it is worthy to note that Demirci et al. computed y 
Preliminary Results
First, by the key schedule of AES-192, we easily get the following equations:
(1)
Next, we can similarly obtain the following 4-round differential property by applying Demirci et al.'s method to Demirci and Selçuk's 4-round property. The reason that we target byte (12) is that we can deduce byte (12) of K 6 (i.e. K 6,12 ) from the 8-th round key K 8 by Eq. (3). 
Attacking 8-Round AES-192
Using the 4-round differential property given in Proposition 3, we can now devise a meet-in-the-middle attack on 8-round AES-192; the attack is solely based on Demirci and Selçuk's and Demirci et al.'s work and the above observation on the key schedule, and its procedure is as follows, where n 1 and n 2 are small non-negative numbers and their specific values will be given below. (12) just after the first round; and we denote it by ( P i,0 , P i,1 , · · · , P i,32 ). (c) Guess a value for (K 8 , K 7,9 , K 7,12 ), and do as follows.
i. Compute ( K 6,12 , K 7,3 , K 7,6 ) by Eqs. (1)- (3).
ii. Partially decrypt the sequence of ciphertexts corresponding to ( P i,0 , P i,1 , · · · , P i,32 ) with (K 8 , K 7,3 , K 7,6 , K 7,9 , K 7,12 , K 6,12 ) to get the sequence of the intermediate values for byte (12) just before the sixth round; and we denote it by ( represents the ratio of the number of the columns that need to decrypt to the total number of the columns in 8-round AES. In Step 3(c)-(iii), for a wrong guess of (K 0,1 , K 0,6 , K 0,11 , K 0,12 , K 1,12 , K 7,9 , K 7,12 , K 8 ), the probability that the sequence (
, and thus the probability that a sequence from the set Step 3(c)-(iii), for the correct guess of (K 0,1 , K 0,6 , K 0,11 , K 0,12 , K 1,12 , K 7,9 , K 7,12 , K 8 ), the probability that a sequence from the set {( 
Notes:
1. As mentioned in [10] , the time complexity of a one-off precomputation is typically not counted as part of the time complexity of an attack, since it can be performed at the cryptanalyst's leisure. We notice that this might be controversial, and for conservatism we make the sum of all the time complexities in each of our attacks smaller than that for exhaustive key search. 2. Observe that meet-in-the-middle attacks on 8-round AES-256 can be easily obtained by modifying the above 8-round AES-192 attack procedure. A typical one requires 2 32 chosen plaintexts and a memory of 2 197.33 bytes, and has a time complexity of 2 202.95 8-round AES-256 encryptions, plus a precomputation that has a time complexity of 2 194.95 8-round AES-256 encryptions. This is slightly better than but comparable to the 8-round AES-256 attack presented in [4] . Thus, we do not need to guess K 8,0 in Step 3(c) of the above 8-round AES-192 attack, reducing the attack's time complexity by a factor of 2 8 . Further, we can obtain a data-time-memory tradeoff version with a success probability of 98%: The precomputation has a time complexity of 2 194.63−n1 8-round AES-192 encryptions, and the attack requires 2 34+n2 chosen plaintexts and a memory of 2 197−n1 bytes, and has a time complexity of 2 180.63+n2 8-round AES-192 encryptions. Typically, let n 1 = n 2 = 7, then the precomputation has a time complexity of 2 187.63 8-round AES-192 encryptions, and the attack requires 2 41 chosen plaintexts and a memory of 2 190 bytes, and has a time complexity of 2 187.63 8-round AES-192 encryptions.
Conclusion
We have given a meet-in-the-middle attack on 8-round AES-192, building solely on Demirci and Selçuk's and Demirci et al.'s work [4, 5] plus a simple observation on the key schedule. Finally, we have described a more efficient attack which is based on encrypting 2 41 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2
187.63
8-round AES-192 encryptions. Our attack has a greater time and memory complexity than the currently known attacks on 8-round AES-192, however its data complexity is dramatically smaller.
